ByLock

ByLock was a smartphone application that allowed users to communicate via a private, encrypted connection. It was launched in March 2014 on Google Play, Apple App Store^[1] The app was downloaded over 600,000 times from its launch in April 2014 until March 2016, when it was permanently shut down.^[2] The Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Turkish: Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT) stated that the app was downloaded mainly in Turkey and the users were “Fetullahist Terror Organisation (FETÖ) which was formerly known as “Gülen movement” members.^[3]

In Turkey, possession of the app is deemed evidence of membership in the Gülen Movement, which was allegedly connected to the failed Turkish coup d'état attempt in July 2016.^[4] Users of ByLock were deemed terrorists in Turkish courts.^[5] According to Deutsche Welle, of the 215,000 former ByLock users, an estimated 23,000 have been detained by Turkish authorities. Some believe that the MİT and other Turkish authorities manipulated the ByLock database in order to arrest suspected members of the Gülen Movement.^[5] Tuncay Beşikçi, a computer forensic expert in Turkey, emphasized that "the demands to investigate and analyze ByLock data from independent institutions are refused by the Turkish courts. But it is not normal".^{[citation needed]} Tuncay Beşikçi believes that this application is precisely one of the channels for Gülen molecules to communicate and can also monitor the activities of other members of the organization.^[6] He also stated that the developers behind the Mor Beyin app, deliberately set a plan in motion that would put thousands of innocent people in prison as a cover for the Gülen movement.^[7]

In December 2017, Turkish authorities revealed that almost half the people who had been prosecuted for having ByLock on their smartphones would have their legal cases reviewed, as they could have been redirected to the app without their knowledge.^[8]

Following the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016, the use of the ByLock messaging application by members of the Gülen Movement was the sole evidence in investigations and prosecutions to justify arrests and convictions for "membership in an armed terrorist organization." However, these decisions have been considered human rights violations by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Some of the relevant decisions include the following:

On 20 July 2021, in the case of Tekin Akgün v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that the use of the ByLock messaging application, unless supported by other evidence, does not create a reasonable suspicion of a crime.^[9] Based on this reasoning, the court found that the detention order violated Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to liberty and security.^[10][11] In the Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Turkey decision on 26 September 2023, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) examined an appeal against a conviction based on the use of ByLock. The Court ruled that the failure to provide an opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the ByLock data violated the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the ECHR).^[12] The Court also stated that the mere use of ByLock could not be considered sufficient evidence for membership in an armed terrorist organization.^[13] It further noted that local courts had established an automatic presumption of guilt based solely on ByLock use, creating a broad and unpredictable interpretation of the law, making it nearly impossible for the accused to exonerate themselves.^[14] Therefore, the Court concluded that the conviction based on the use of ByLock violated the principle of no punishment without law (Article 7 of the ECHR).^[15][16][17] On 22 July 2025, in the Demirhan and 238 Others case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) consolidated the applications of 239 individuals who had been convicted of "membership in an armed terrorist organization" based on their use of ByLock, as determined by 239 separate courts in Turkey. The Court ruled that the convictions violated the right to a fair trial under Article 6 and the principle of no punishment without law under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).^[18] The ruling stated that the Turkish courts' "categorical approach" to the use of ByLock lacked legal foundation. In this context, it was emphasized that anyone who had used ByLock could not be convicted of membership in an armed terrorist organization based solely on this reasoning.^[19][1] The ruling also stated that, due to the large number of similar applications, the issue was "systemic in nature" and it called for a national solution to be developed by Turkey.^[20] While the Court did not order compensation for the 239 applicants, it emphasized that reopening the trial to ensure the enforcement of the violation ruling was the most appropriate remedy.^[21][1] This ruling, which confirms the violation finding in the Yüksel Yalçınkaya case of 26 September 2023, is considered a continuation of the ECHR's case law concerning trials based on ByLock evidence.

In the İsmet Özçelik and Turgay Karaman v. Turkey decision, dated 28 May 2019 (Application No. 2980/2017), the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that the use of ByLock and allegations of depositing money into Bank Asya could not justify the applicants' arrests.^[22][23][24] In the Mestan Yayman v. Turkey decision (Opinion No. 42/2018 – 21 August 2018) by the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, it was stated that using a public messaging application like ByLock cannot be considered criminal evidence, and that the use of such an application falls under the scope of freedom of thought and expression.^[25][26][27] The dozens of decisions later issued by the UN Human Rights Council Working Group are of the same nature.^[28][29]