Wikipedia

Your Movement

Your Movement
Twój Ruch
FounderJanusz Palikot
Founded1 June 2011 (RP)
6 October 2013 (TR)
DissolvedJanuary 2023
Split fromCivic Platform
Headquartersul. Nowy Świat 39
00-029 Warsaw
IdeologyLibertarianism[1]
Neoliberalism[2]
Progressivism[3]
Social liberalism[4]
Populism[5]
Political positionEconomic:[A]
Right-wing[6]
Sociocultural:
Left-wing[7]
Colours  Orange
  Blue
Website
twojruch.eu
^ A: The party was variously described as right-wing,[11] centre-right,[12] centrist,[15] centre-left,[17] and left-wing.[18] It mixed economical liberalism[19] (compared to Thatcherism),[20] and social progressivism.[21]
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Your Movement (Polish: Twój Ruch, which can also be translated as Your Move,[22] TR) was a social liberal, neoliberal and anti-clerical political party in Poland.[26] The party was founded by Janusz Palikot, a former Civic Platform MP, in October 2010[27] as Palikot's Movement (Polish: Ruch Palikota, RP). The party was classified as a right-wing,[28] centre-right,[12] centrist,[29] centre-left,[30] or a left-wing[18] party in the context of Polish politics, one which was "struggling with its political identity and finding it difficult to decide whether it was really a left-wing party at all or more of an economically and socially liberal centrist grouping."[14]

It combined "a liberal approach both to matters of world-view and to free market solutions".[31] Palikot's Movement wanted to end religious education in state schools, end state subsidies of churches, legalize abortion on demand, lower the voting age to 16,[32] give out free condoms,[33] allow same-sex marriages,[27] switch to the mixed-member proportional representation system,[34] reform the Social Security Agency, abolish the Senate,[35] legalize cannabis,[36] raise the retirement age,[37] replace free university programs with tuition-based paid ones,[19] and implement flat taxes.[38] The party adopted its revised name and programme on 6 October 2013.[22][39]

History

[edit]

Origins

[edit]

The party was founded by Janusz Palikot, a Polish millionaire who served as the MP of Civic Platform between 2005 and 2010. During his mandate, he became known for controversial and eccentric stunts; in 2007, he appeared on a television program wearing a t-shirt that read "I am gay". He also attacked his own party on LGBT issues, arguing that its inaction was more detrimental to LGBT rights than socially conservative parties such as League of Polish Families and Law and Justice were.[40] The same year, he made a press conference wielding a toy gun and a dildo.[41] He would frequently accuse political opponents of being closeted homosexuals, including accusing Roman Giertych of having a "suppressed homosexual passion" and offering 50,000 PLN for anyone who could prove Giertych's purported homosexuality.[42]

In July 2010, Janusz Palikot—then still a member of Civic Platform (PO)—suggested that the late President Lech Kaczyński was himself to blame for the Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash in Smolensk, Russia. In the aftermath of the resulting controversy, Palikot announced plans to create his own social movement.[43] Palikot claimed that Kaczyński "has blood on his hands" and "bears moral responsibility" for the disaster, and in face of the backlash, both from his party and the public, he created his blog where he claimed: "There are 10 million of us! That many people in Poland believe that Lech Kaczyński or his milieu brought about the Smolensk catastrophe" and declared that he would found a movement against "bishops and elites".[44]

On 2 October, he organized the "Modern Poland" congress in Warsaw, attended by several thousand. At the congress, Palikot announced his 15-point program.[45] His 15 postulates included separation of Church and sttae, civil unions for same-sex couples, universal access to the Internet, first-past-the-post elections in Poland (instead of proportional representation, abolition of the Polish Senate, and abolition of parliamentary immunity. His program was described as an "articulation of anti-clericalism, liberalism, and populism".[44]

2011 election

[edit]

On 6 October, Palikot resigned from PO,[46] along with Kazimierz Kutz. On 9 January 2011, Palikot gave his MP ID card to the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity to be auctioned off.[47] On 1 June 2011, Palikot formally registered his movement as a political party called Palikot Movement (RP). In the October 2011 parliamentary election, the party received 10 percent of the vote and won 40 seats in the Sejm,[48] making it the third party in the chamber behind Civic Platform and Law and Justice (PiS), one of the best debut performances for a party since the end of communism.[49] After the election, one of the MPs of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Sławomir Kopyciński, decided to leave his party and join Palikot Movement.[50]

Anna Grodzka, the first ever transgender MP in European history, was elected from the party lists in 2011.[51] Also, Robert Biedroń became the first openly gay MP in Polish political history. One parliamentarian, Roman Kotliński, is a former priest of the Catholic Church. On 8 March 2012, Łukasz Gibała, head of the Krakow structures of the governing PO, joined Palikot Movement, becoming the 43rd MP of the party. His transfer was somewhat significant in that he is the nephew of the Minister of Justice Jarosław Gowin. On 3 February 2013, Palikot Movement and Racja PL started collaboration with Social Democracy of Poland, Labour United and Union of the Left to form an electoral alliance named Europa Plus to contest the upcoming European Parliament elections.[52][53] The project was led by Marek Siwiec, Aleksander Kwasniewski and Janusz Palikot. On 6 May 2013, Palikot Movement registered its first local party committee abroad, which had been formed by Poles residing in Brussels, Belgium.[54]

In the Sejm

[edit]

Once in the Sejm, the party came to be seen as unreliable and untrustworthy. Polish journalist Igor Janke wrote: "Palikot is known to regularly change his mind and opinions – sometimes he voices extreme liberal economic views, sometimes he is a socialist calling for redistribution. Once he was a conservative – now he is a leftist."[55] Marcin Makowski attacked the movement as "capitalist business" which "preferred to fight for free cannabis rather than for a labour market free of predatory job contracts."[56] Palikot came to be seen as "an eccentric libertarian vodka magnate".[57] Jan Lityński stated: "We have a Palikot party that was supposed to be left wing, but it failed because the leader Janusz Palikot did not know himself whether he represents a right-wing or left-wing movement. The Palikot party does not have any long-term program but only short-run initiatives."[58]

From 2012 onwards, Palikot would take "an abrupt leftward turn" by pursuing alliance with left-leaning parties. In February 2012 he wrote a letter to Leszek Miller where he insisted on the "need for an authentic left-wing politics". This culminated on 6 October 2013,[59] when the party was renamed and refounded as Your Movement (TR).[22] Palikot also hired Piotr Ikonowicz, a known socialist activist, as policy advisor. At the same time, he doubled down on free-market, neoliberal policies such as replacing progressive taxation with flat tax. When challenged on mixing neoliberal and left-wing positions, Palikot "we are neither left nor right". The party came to be seen as ideologically incoherent save for anti-clericalism and sociocultural libertarianism.[59]

The party's popularity quickly dwindled; by 2014, the party polled around 3%.[60] Palikot failed to capitalise on his party's success, and the voters increasingly disapproved of what was perceived as his erratic behavior and political inconsistency. The party's aggressively anti-Catholic views provoked a "counter-reformation" movement in Poland, mobilizing Catholics and the right-leaning electorate to halt secularization of the Polish society.[61] This prompted the party to tone down its anti-clericalism and social liberalism and promote free-market economics as an attempt to reinvent the party.[62] The party's 2013 program was seen as very fiscally conservative - it postulated abolition of Social Insurance Institution to "free companies from unnecessary burdens and reduce shadow economy", and a flat 20% VAT rate, which would have increased the VAT rate for food and medicine.[63]

Downfall

[edit]

The party founded an electoral alliance Europa Plus together with Labour Union, SDPL and the Union of the Left.[59] On 25 May 2014, in the 2014 European election, Europa Plus received 3.6% of the vote, below the 5% electoral threshold, thus failed to elect any MEPs.[39][64] On 29 May 2014, Europa Plus was disbanded.[65] In May 2015, Palikot ran in the 2015 Polish presidential election. He won 1.4% of the vote, considered a "derisory" amount given the party's 2011 success.[62]

In July 2015, TR and the SLD, Labour United (UP) and The Greens (PZ) formed the United Left (ZL) electoral alliance to contest the upcoming parliamentary election.[66][67] The alliance was boycotted by a newly-founded left-wing Razem party, which objected to the presence of liberal elements such as Palikot and his party in the alliance. As a result, Razem ran separately.[68] In the 2015 Polish parliamentary election (held on 25 October 2015), the United Left list was led by Your Movement's Barbara Nowacka and received only 7.6% of the vote, below the 8% threshold, leaving TR without parliamentary representation. Most of TR's voters from 2011 abandoned it in the 2015 election, including 25% of the party's voters defecting to the Kukiz'15 party.[69] Razem won over 3.6% of the vote, which was not enough to cross the 5% electoral threshold, but did suffice for the 3% threshold needed for a party to receive state funding.[68] This left the Sejm without a single nominally left-of-center formation for the first time after 1989.[59]

In December 2017, Palikot announced his retirement from politics.[70] In the 2019 Polish parliamentary election, the party stood under the banner of The Left. The party disbanded in January 2023.[71]

Ideology

[edit]
Political alignment of post-1989 Polish political parties on a two-dimensional spectrum. Your Movement is coded as TR (RP).[72]

Sources described Palikot Movement as liberal,[73][74] anti-clerical,[73][74][75] and pro-European.[76] Media variously described Palikot Movement as economically liberal,[19] libertarian,[77][78] liberal,[79][80][81] anti-clerical,[82] and populist.[25][83] The British Financial Times newspaper described the economic views of the Palikot Movement membership as heterogenous, ranging from libertarianism to social democracy.[84] According to the political scientist Aleks Szczerbiak, the party struggled with its political identity and was an economically and socially liberal, centrist party rather than a left-wing one.[14] Political scientist Michał Syska argued that ultimately Your Movement was "related to Thatcherism rather than social democracy in its economic postulates", considering the left-wing label inadequate.[20]

Palikot's Movement was described as a "liberal populist party whose progressive policies on some social and cultural issues are combined with a commitment to neoliberal economic reform."[19] It had a neoliberal economic programme - its most famous economic proposal was introducing flat tax rates instead of the progressive taxation that Poland had at the time. The party also argued that students should pay for their studies and wished to make university tuition paid instead of free.[19] The party supported "liquidating any barriers to business activity", abolition of tax and social security privileges for groups like the farmers, raising the employment age and restricting retirement privileges. It also proposed a creation of a "probusiness parliamentary commission".[85] It was described as "strongly anti-union" and a party that "represents business circles rather than employees".[86] The party supported "one European state", and attacked right-wing parties for obstructing Polish integration into the EU through social conservatism and opposition to the EU climate policy.[87]

The party had a "blatant anti-church program" and rose to prominence by promising to remove the Presidential Palace cross.[88] Socially, it wanted to prohibit religion lessons in schools, eliminate religious symbols in public buildings, and introduce sexual education in schools. It was described as "vehemently anti-clerical". Additionally, it also supported abortion on demand, legalizing soft drugs, and introduction of same-sex civil unions. It also spoke for centralization of Polish administration and government, as it sought to reduce the number of Sejm seats, eliminate the Senate, and decrease the number of councilors of the local government, while liquidating some branches of local government completely.[37] It also proposed a ban on the participation of the clergy in state ceremonies.[85]

Your Movement was described as social-liberal,[89] anti-clerical[90] and pro-European.[90] Anti-clericalism was considered the core belief of the party - it was also described as anti-Catholic and antireligious.[91] The party placed an emphasis upon supporting LGBT rights.[92] At the same time, the party's commitment to social progressivism was called into question - the leader of the party, Janusz Palikot, suggested that the Polish feminist activist and MP Wanda Nowicka "perhaps desired to be raped" when she refused to step down from her post.[93] Its ideology was considered a type of liberal populism that combined economic liberalism with social progressivism, which often isolated the party from left-wing parties such as the social-democratic SLD.[21]

Election results

[edit]

Sejm

[edit]
Election Leader(s) Votes % Seats Change Government
2011 Janusz Palikot 1,439,490 10.0
40 / 460
 New PO-PSL
2015 Janusz Palikot
Barbara Nowacka 		1,147,102 7.6
0 / 460
 Decrease 40 PiS
As part of the United Left, which did not win any seats.
2019 Marzenna Karkoszka
Kamil Żebrowski 		2,319,946 12.6
0 / 460
 Steady PiS
As part of The Left, which won 49 seats in total.

Presidential

[edit]
Election year Candidate 1st round 2nd round
# of overall votes % of overall vote # of overall votes % of overall vote
2015 Janusz Palikot 211,242 1.42 (#7)

European Parliament

[edit]
Election Leader Votes % Seats Change
2014 Janusz Palikot 252,699 3.6
0 / 51
 New
As part of the Europa Plus-Your Movement, which did not win any seats.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c
    • Gaudot, Edouard (7 May 2024). "A Disaffected Generation? The Youth Vote and Europe's Future". Green European Journal: 4. But the need for radicalism and young Poles' mistrust of their political class and national leaders has also been expressed by repeated bouts of voting for anti-establishment candidates or parties, like the libertarian Palikot Movement (Ruch Poparcia Palikota) in 2011, or the far-right populist Kukiz-15 party led by rockstar Paweł Kukiz in 2015.
    • Kim, Seongcheol; Borbáth, Endre (2022). "A Typology of Postcommunist Successor Parties in Central and Eastern Europe and an Explanatory Framework for Their (Non-)Success". East Central Europe. 49 (2–3). Brill Publishers: 277-311. doi:10.30965/18763308-49020007. The SLD subsequently tried to position itself as the standard-bearer of "the left" on both the socioeconomic and the sociocultural dimensions, but again suffered electorally when it was outflanked on the sociocultural left in 2011 by the centrist-libertarian Palikot's Movement and on both dimensions in 2015 by the left-libertarian Razem (see appendix: figure 1).
    • Gwiazda, Anna; Minkova, Liana (2023). "Gendered Advocacy Coalitions and the Istanbul Convention: A Comparative Analysis of Bulgaria and Poland". International Feminist Journal of Politics. 26 (1). Taylor & Francis: 13. doi:10.1080/14616742.2023.2214566. The Palikot Movement(later called Your Movement) was a libertarian, anti-clerical center-left party.
    • Crespy, Amandine; Parks, Louisa (2017). "The connection between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition in the EU. From ACTA to the financial crisis". Journal of European Integration. 39 (4). Routledge: 8. doi:10.1080/07036337.2017.1309038. ISSN 1477-2280. First, public statements were made distancing different countries from ACTA, including Poland where this followed a rebellion staged by MPs from the left-libertarian Palikot movement wearing Guy Fawkes masks (the symbol of Anonymous) during a parliamentary session.
  2. ^
    • Seongcheol Kim (2022). "Populism in Poland". Discourse, Hegemony, and Populism in the Visegrád Four. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. Routledge. pp. 207–208. ISBN 978-1-003-18600-7. In the election campaign, RP's liberalism had even incorporated the PO's earlier demand for a flat tax; shortly after the elections, however, the RP parliamentary group brought on the well-known left-wing labor activist Piotr Ikonowicz as a social policy advisor. Pushed in an interview about how he would reconcile such leftwing and neo-liberal positions within the same party, Palikot maintained that "we are neither left nor right"; when the interviewer pointed out that "anticlericalism" seems to be the only unifying element, Palikot effectively conceded the point by responding: "Not only anti-clericalism, but issues of worldview [światopoglądowe] in general".
    • Woś, Rafał [in Polish] (20 August 2018). "Woś: Lewico, czas na współpracę z PiS. Trzeba budować z Kaczyńskim demokratyczny socjalizm". Gazeta.pl. Ikonowicz i paru innych lewicowców rozpuszczali się w liberalnym projekcie Ruchu Palikota. Skutkiem było utwierdzenie gospodarczej hegemonii neoliberałów, zepchnięcie lewicy do światopoglądowego skansenu i oderwanie od słabych oraz przegranych, którzy powinni stanowić rację istnienia każdego lewicowego ruchu (inaczej po co komu lewica?). [Ikonowicz and a few other leftists dissolved into the liberal project of Palikot's Movement. The result was the consolidation of the economic hegemony of its neoliberalism, the relegation of its leftism to the sociocultural dimension, and a disconnect from the weak and the poor, who should be the raison d'être of any leftist movement (otherwise, what is the point of the left?).]
    • Gruszczyński, Arek (7 September 2015). "Zjednoczona? Krótkie podsumowanie zabaw lewicy". Magazyn Kontakt (in Polish). Palikot nie ma spójnego programu politycznego. W kwestiach światopoglądowych jest radykalnym liberałem, z przeszłością właściciela ultra-katolickiego tygodnika „Ozon". Gospodarczo jest zmienny. Widzieliśmy już Palikota domagającego się obniżenia podatków (jakby było z czego obniżać) i Palikota łączącego w jednym wystąpieniu postulaty lewicy i neoliberałów. [Palikot does not have a coherent political program. On sociocultural issues, he is a radical liberal, with a past as the owner of the ultra-Catholic weekly magazine Ozon. Economically, he is inconsistent. We have already seen Palikot demanding tax cuts (as if there were anything to cut), Palikot combining the demands of the left and neoliberalism.]
    • Rae, Gavin (2012). "Austerity Policies in Europe: The Case of Poland" (PDF). Interational Policy Analysis. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: 7. RP is a liberal populist party that combines support for neoliberalism (for example, a flat income-tax rate) alongside strong cultural liberal policies (for example, on the separation of church and state, liberalising the drug law and so on). In recent months, it has backed the government in its austerity drive, voting in parliament, for example, to raise the pension age.
    • Girelli, Gian Paolo; Orso, Renato (16 October 2011). "Polonia, nel segno della continuità". Estovest (in Italian). Una sorpresa per un Paese tradizionalmente conservatore e cattolico, l'exploit del movimento neoliberale, radicale e anticlericale, a favore della legalizzazione della marijuana e delle nozze gay, guidato da Janusz Palikot, un ricco ed eccentrico imprenditore che ha ottenuto il 10% e ha portato per la prima volta sui banchi del parlamento nazionale un deputato transessuale. [A surprise for a traditionally conservative and Catholic country, the success of the neoliberal, radical and anti-clerical movement in favour of the legalisation of marijuana and gay marriage, led by Janusz Palikot, a wealthy and eccentric entrepreneur who obtained 10% of the vote and brought a transgender MP to the national parliament for the first time.]
    • Urne, Alle (10 October 2011). "Voto Polonia, liberali riconfermati: Vince di nuovo il premier Tusk". TgCom24. Al terzo posto c'è il Movimento di Palikot, neoliberale e a favore della legalizzazione della marijuana e delle nozze gay, che ha ottenuto il 9,8%. Solo quinta l'Alleanza democratica di sinistra (8,2%). [In third place is Palikot's Movement, which is neoliberal and in favour of legalising marijuana and gay marriage, which obtained 9.8%. The Democratic Left Alliance came in fifth (8.2%).]
  3. ^
    • Sałek, Paulina; Sztajdel, Agnieszka (2019). "Poland – 'Modern' versus 'Normal': The Increasing Importance of the Cultural Divide". In Swen Hutter; Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.). European Party Politics in Times of Crisis. Cambridge University Press. p. 197. doi:10.1017/9781108652780.009. ISBN 9781108652780. The entrance of new parties (the progressive Your Movement, left-wing Together, classic liberal Modern, anti-establishment nationalistic Kukiz'15) has just deepened the crucial division between the Polish right and left.
    • Bratcher, Ian (2021). "Ideological Others and National Identifications in Contemporary Poland" (PDF). Nations and Nationalism. 26 (3). Wiley: 181. doi:10.1111/nana.12598. Soon after stepping down as president of KPH and cutting his political ties with SLD, Biedroń affiliated himself with the progressive Palikot movement.
    • de Lima, Bernardo Pires (2019). The B-Side of Europe: A Journey to the 28 Capital Cities (1st ed.). Lisbon: Tinta‑da‑china. p. 111. Bodnar mentions the example of the Mayor of Slupsk, Robert Biedron: openly gay and a member of the progressive Your Movement, a party founded in 2010.
    • Lansford, Tom (2022). Jorge Brown; John M. Callahan; David Harms Holt; Robert J. Pauly Jr.; Alexander D. Stephenson (eds.). Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021. Vol. 2. p. 1341. ISBN 978-1-5443-8471-9. ISSN 0193-175X. Your Movement (Twój Ruch—TR). Palikot's Movement (Ruch Palikota—RP) was founded as a progressive, anticlerical party by Janus PALIKOT, a flamboyant entrepreneur and defector from the PO.
  4. ^
    • Błoch, Marcel (2023). Uwarunkowania polityki klimatycznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (PDF) (Doctor thesis) (in Polish). Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski. p. 80. K. Kowalczyk do partii liberalnych, a w tych ramach do nurtu socjalliberalnego, zaliczył Twój Ruch, powstały w 2013 r. z przekształcenia Ruchu Palikota. [K. Kowalczyk classified Your Movement, established in 2013 as a result of the transformation of Palikot's Movement, as a liberal party and, within this framework, as part of the social liberal ideology.]
    • Shekhovtsov, Anton (2021). The Rise and Fall of a Polish Agent of the Kremlin Influence: The Case of Janusz Niedźwiecki (PDF). European Platform for Democratic Elections. p. 14. Later, he got interested in politics and joined the youth wing of the social-liberal Palikot's Movement party (Ruch Palikota), founded by Janusz Palikot.
    • Prończuk, Monika (12 February 2020). "Who's who in Poland's presidential elections". Notes from Poland. A long-term LGBT rights activist, Biedroń was a member of parliament representing the social-liberal Your Movement party, before becoming mayor of the city of Słupsk.
    • Raś, Maciej (2017). "Foreign and Security Policy in the Party Discourse in Poland: Main Futures" (PDF). UNISCI Journal (43): 121. New and competitive (with regard to the SLD) anti-system political parties - the "Palikot's Movement"14 created by Janusz Palikot (reported as a centerleft/social-liberal, although more liberal than the SLD in the context of economy, and with strong emphasis on anti-clericalism; nowadays: the "Your Movement"15), and "Razem" ("Together", strongly leftist, dominated by young activists) - worsened the SLD's political position.
    • Sitter, Nick; Batory, Agnes; Krizsan, Andrea; Zentai, Violetta (10 April 2017). "WP6 Political Leadership, National Politics, and Transboundary Crisis Management" (PDF). Deliverable D6.2 Backsliding in area of constitutional safeguards and independent institutions, corruption control, and general equality and minorities. Central European University: 16–17. However, the major story of this election was the success of the Palikot Movement (RP), an anti-clerical liberal party formed by the controversial businessman Janusz Palikot. The party proposed a socially liberal program that included reducing the influence of Poland's powerful Catholic Church in public life, the de-criminalization of so-called 'soft' drugs, abortion on demand, and more rights for sexual and other minorities including the legalization of same-sex civil unions.
  5. ^
    • Lenik, Paulina (2023). "The two dissimilar cases of a rise in populism: case studies of Poland and Czechia". In Dajč, Haris; Styczyńska, Natasza (eds.). Faces of populism in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press. p. 89. doi:10.4467/K7466.155/22.23.17542. ISBN 978-83-233-7466-4. The populist offer in Poland continues to be dominated by PiS, however, it also includes anti-liberal, nationalist calls against the 'Republic of the Rich,' an anti-clerical entrepreneurial populism of Palikot's movement and the anti-party, nationalist, celebrity populism by Kukiz's 2015 party.
    • Kulesza, Czesław; Piotrowska, Katarzyna; Rae, Gavin (2018). Left Wing Non-Voters in Poland. Warsaw: Fundacja „NAPRZÓD”. p. 10. Support for the left continued to decline until the 2011 elections, at which the SLD was replaced as the main self-proclaimed party of the left by the liberal populist Palikot Movement.
    • Zuba, Krzysztof (2017). "From fringe to fringe: the shift from the clericalist League of Polish Families to the anticlericalist Palikot Movement 2001–2015". Religion, State and Society. 45 (2). Routledge: 88. doi:10.1080/09637494.2017.1290327. Four years after that, in 2011, the anticlericalist leftist populist Palikot Movement (Ruch Palikota (RP)) achieved extraordinary success.
    • Seongcheol Kim (2022). "Populism in Poland". Discourse, Hegemony, and Populism in the Visegrád Four. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. Routledge. p. 165. ISBN 978-1-003-18600-7. In this context, populism also emerges in the form of the ultimately short-lived challenges of Palikot's Movement (RP) and Kukiz'15 in the 2011 and 2015 election campaigns, respectively.
  6. ^
    • Wasiuta, Martyna (2015). "Populizm Ruchu Palikota" [Populism of Ruch Palikota]. Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne (in Polish). 45 (1): 173. doi:10.15804/athena.2015.45.09. ISSN 1505-2192. Ostatnia cecha konstytutywna populizmu, jaką proponował R. Tokarczyk, to wielość inspiracji, a więc kombinacja różnych ideologii, często postulowanie trzeciej drogi i możliwości pogodzenia myśli lewicowej z prawicową. Można powiedzieć, że w tym aspekcie ruch Palikota jest modelowym przedstawicielem populizmu. Odnajdujemy to zarówno w programie, jak i w wypowiedziach polityków tej partii. Bez wątpienia dostrzegamy postulaty lewicowe w sferze światopoglądowej i związany z tradycją prawicy nacisk na rozwój przedsiębiorczości, postulowanie podatku liniowego czy nawet sprzeciw wobec biurokracji, charakterystyczny dla partii tzw. nowej prawicy, nowego populizmu. [The last constitutive feature of populism proposed by R. Tokarczyk is the multiplicity of inspirations, i.e. a combination of different ideologies, often postulating a third way and reconciling left-wing and right-wing ideas. It can be said that in this respect, Palikot's movement is a model representative of populism. We find this both in the programme and in the statements of the party's politicians. We undoubtedly see left-wing postulates in the sociocultural sphere and, in line with the economically right-wing tradition, an emphasis on the development of entrepreneurship, the postulation of a flat tax, and even opposition to bureaucracy, characteristic of the so-called new right-wing parties, the new populism.]
    • Válková, Jana; Győry, Adrienn; Szelewa, Dorota; Polakowski, Michal (2018). "Politics of childcare policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland" (PDF). International Public Policy: 29. In the economic dimension they represent right-wing policies with preference for universal flat-tax policies.
    • Baumann, Sofie Hillestad (2020). Party Competition as an Explanation for New Parties’ Decision to Reenter Elections and Electoral Success: A Heckman’s Selection Model of New Parties in Central and Eastern Europe (PDF) (Master of Comparative Politics thesis). University of Bergen. p. 53. See infographic (Figure 6.4).
    • Kosowska-Gąstoł, Beata (2021). Aleksandra Kruk (ed.). "Te same, ale czy takie same? Analiza oblicza ideowo-programowego polskich partii politycznych – różne perspektywy metodologiczne". Postulaty Polityczne I Wyborcze Partii Politycznych (in Polish). Zielona Góra: 27. See infographic (Table 5).
  7. ^
    • Wasiuta, Martyna (2015). "Populizm Ruchu Palikota" [Populism of Ruch Palikota]. Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne (in Polish). 45 (1): 173. doi:10.15804/athena.2015.45.09. ISSN 1505-2192. Ostatnia cecha konstytutywna populizmu, jaką proponował R. Tokarczyk, to wielość inspiracji, a więc kombinacja różnych ideologii, często postulowanie trzeciej drogi i możliwości pogodzenia myśli lewicowej z prawicową. Można powiedzieć, że w tym aspekcie ruch Palikota jest modelowym przedstawicielem populizmu. Odnajdujemy to zarówno w programie, jak i w wypowiedziach polityków tej partii. Bez wątpienia dostrzegamy postulaty lewicowe w sferze światopoglądowej i związany z tradycją prawicy nacisk na rozwój przedsiębiorczości, postulowanie podatku liniowego czy nawet sprzeciw wobec biurokracji, charakterystyczny dla partii tzw. nowej prawicy, nowego populizmu. [The last constitutive feature of populism proposed by R. Tokarczyk is the multiplicity of inspirations, i.e. a combination of different ideologies, often postulating a third way and reconciling left-wing and right-wing ideas. It can be said that in this respect, Palikot's movement is a model representative of populism. We find this both in the programme and in the statements of the party's politicians. We undoubtedly see left-wing postulates in the sociocultural sphere and, in line with the economically right-wing tradition, an emphasis on the development of entrepreneurship, the postulation of a flat tax, and even opposition to bureaucracy, characteristic of the so-called new right-wing parties, the new populism.]
    • Baumann, Sofie Hillestad (2020). Party Competition as an Explanation for New Parties’ Decision to Reenter Elections and Electoral Success: A Heckman’s Selection Model of New Parties in Central and Eastern Europe (PDF) (Master of Comparative Politics thesis). University of Bergen. p. 53. See infographic (Figure 6.4).
    • Kosowska-Gąstoł, Beata (2021). Aleksandra Kruk (ed.). "Te same, ale czy takie same? Analiza oblicza ideowo-programowego polskich partii politycznych – różne perspektywy metodologiczne". Postulaty Polityczne I Wyborcze Partii Politycznych (in Polish). Zielona Góra: 27. Inaczej wygląda kwestia ulokowania partii na osi lewica-prawica w wymiarze światopoglądowym, która pozwala na pokazanie różnic między partiami (tab. 6). Najdalej na lewicy uplasował się pod tym względem Ruch Palikota w 2011 roku, po lewej stronie sceny politycznej znalazły się w całym badanym okresie SLD, PSL (z wyjątkiem 2001 r.) oraz Samoobrona. [The issue of placing parties on the left-right axis in terms of their sociocultural outlook, which allows the differences between parties to be highlighted, looks different (Table 6). In this respect, Palikot's Movement was the most left-wing party in 2011, while the SLD, PSL (except for 2001) and Samoobrona were also placed on the left side of this political dimension throughout the entire period under study.]
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  10. ^ a b Kosowska-Gąstoł, Beata (2021). Aleksandra Kruk (ed.). "Te same, ale czy takie same? Analiza oblicza ideowo-programowego polskich partii politycznych – różne perspektywy metodologiczne". Postulaty Polityczne I Wyborcze Partii Politycznych (in Polish). Zielona Góra: 26. Po prawej stronie w badanym okresie lokowała się LPR, Ruch Palikota oraz Nowoczesna, po lewej Samoobrona oraz SLD. [During the period under review, LPR, Palikot's Movement and Nowoczesna were on the right, while Samoobrona and SLD were on the left.]
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