Wikipedia

Talk:Al-Qaeda

Syria is allies

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The new goverment in syria doesn’t crack down on al qaeda activity and is made up of former al qaeda affiliates 93.106.11.230 (talk) 11:48, 12 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

The word terrorism doesn't appear in the opening 4 paragraphs

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So, was Al-Qaeda a terrorist organization? Edit0r6781 (talk) 21:51, 1 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Ba’athist syria isnt allied

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Source there is literal american propaganda the same site also claims assad was allied with isis 217.140.214.96 (talk) 12:26, 24 March 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Very weirdly worded opening

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“ Al-Qaeda is a pan-Islamist militant organization led by Sunni jihadists who self-identify as a vanguard spearheading a global Islamist revolution to unite the Muslim worldunder a supra-national Islamic caliphate. Its membership is mostly composed of Arabs but also includes people from other ethnic groups. Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian, economic and military targets of the U.S. and its allies; such as the 1998 US embassy bombings, the USS Colebombing, and the September 11 attacks.”

this is incredibly strangely worded. “led by Sunni jihadists who self-identify as a vanguard spearheading a global Islamist revolution to unite the Muslim worldunder a supra-national Islamic caliphate.” ??? This makes no sense. “Self-identify”? What is that supposed to mean? “Supra-national Islamic caliphate”? “Vanguard spearheading” ?? What?? Also, the leadership is not mostly Arab. I Would recommend much clearer and more accurate wording. I find V to be V (talk) 04:13, 4 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  • Sorry but it seems pretty clear to me. Yes, they self-identify as such: valid. Few others, I imagine, believe in the reality of that whole global Islamist revolution. The other phrases are also unproblematic. Drmies (talk) 04:14, 4 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    The United States self identifies as a country. Why is that not mentioned? I find V to be V (talk) 05:12, 4 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    No, "self-identify" doesn't make sense at all. Even if it did make sense, an organization cannot "self-identify," only an individual could do that. If you want it to make sense, you could cite a leader or founder that actually stated that Al Qaeda is "a vanguard spearheading a global Islamist revolution to unite the Muslim world yada yada yada"
    I want to know why this page is actually protected too, because it's not due to vandalism. I think it has become protected BECAUSE of Al Qaeda themselves, right? Is that allowed? Are we allowing Al Qaeda to control Wikipedia pages now? Because that isn't okay, you know? Tschwitzer (talk) 06:40, 24 August 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Al-Qaeda's ideology

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Hello @Shadowwarrior8: Regarding your edit here & here. Please check out: 1) the infobox template at the top right-hand corner of the article, 2) Al-Qaeda#Religious_compatibility: "Al-Qaeda counts among its members and supporters people associated with Wahhabism".

As for sources, here are a few:

  • Ami Pedahzur (2005). Suicide Terrorism. Polity. p. 99. ISBN 9780745633831. Al-Qaeda's ideology is based on the Salafi interpretation of Wahhabism.

Peace.--TheEagle107 (talk) 20:49, 7 August 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Wahhabism and Salafism can only be attributed to a few branches of AQ, like AQI. Most of them moved towards IS after 2014. AQC leaders adopted a neutral stance towards Athari-Ash'ari differences, and several AQC leaders like Abu Mus'ab al-Suri were even critical of Salafism. Note that Bin Laden operated al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after pledging bay'ah to the Sufi Islamist Taliban, and supported the Taliban which was suppressing Salafi and Wahhabi groups in Afghanistan at that time. In a 2008 interview session, Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that they do not imitate Ibn Taymiyyah or Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, and asserted that al-Qaeda pursued the unity of Sunni Muslims, including Ash'aris, Atharis and Maturidis. Also, Bin Laden was deeply associated with Sufi militant circles in Afghanistan[1] and advocated mystical intercessionary practices.[2] These are all fundamentally incompatible with Wahhabi ideology.
Additionally, various other academics have criticized the labelling of al-Qaeda as "Wahhabi" or "Salafi Jihadi" by Western military analysts and ignorant journalists. They argue that al-Qaeda and its affiliates should be viewed as a Sunni pan-Islamist armed movement that justifies its activities as part of a defensive struggle against American aggression in various Muslim countries.[3][4] Much of al-Qaeda's Jihadist literature is based on classical Sunni jurisprudence,[5] and extensively quotes both Ash'ari and Athari scholars. Ash'ari, Maturidi and Athari scholars have often jointly issued fatawa on behalf of Al-Qaeda.[6]
Some other sources:

  • "The AQO idea is not exclusively Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively Salafi Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. It is rather a broad, transnational conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement prohibit extremely strict “Muslimness” tests or other instruments designed to split into ever-smaller numbers those considered virtuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands."[7]

  • "The idea of Deobandism is the third doctrinal school for al-Qaedaism. It became popular within northern India in response to reactions against British colonial and imperial power in the nineteenth century."[8]

  • "Everything we know about Al-Qaeda as a religious movement compares favorably with Sufi or mystical brotherhoods... There is, for instance the very emphasis on jihad, which has historically been a characteristic of Sufi groups. Then there is the cult of martyrs, to whom are attributed supernatural powers including the ability to intercede with God for the salvation of their families, something generally frowned upon by anti-Sufi groups, but advocated by Osama bin Laden himself. Along with these are the jihad's definition as an individual ethical obligation supposedly divorced from the political requirements of a state, as well as a rich and occult world of prophetic and other dreams, which are constantly spoken about within Al-Qaeda. ... Apart from the importance of jihad, personal ethics and dreams, we know that Al-Qaeda's leaders are treated by its rank and file as spiritual authorities endowed with a grace that is unrelated to bookish learning of the kind that would mark a traditional cleric or even a fundamentalist. ... If Osama bin Laden, then, is routinely called a shaykh, the same title used for Sufi elders, this is not simply because he happens to be a kind of chieftain ... but because he possesses also a spiritual authority that is manifested in stories of his miraculous preservation from harm ... Indeed it is often in these mystical and occult forms that Al-Qaeda's reputation spreads and gains popular appeal, so that we might even consider its jihad to be a manifestation of Sufism, which has been enjoying a global revival of late."[9]

  • "Al-Qaeda, for instance, has historically had Salafi membership but with a relatively more ecumenical approach... rather than strictly emphasizing Salafi beliefs. This is evident in their support for the non-Salafi Taliban in Afghanistan."[10]

  • "Al-Qaeda also symbolically evokes traditional images of Sufism to validate its present. ... Films and photos of bin Laden are usually shot in caves, conjuring up images of the isolated retreats of Sufi saints. ... Like a Sufi saint, bin Laden's followers believe he has miraculous capacities,... Similarly, Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban, was inspired in a dream to rid Afghanistan of corruption...[11]

  • Statement given by AQ media in an interview with Midstone centre journalist Mona Thakkar in 2022: "We do not consider the jihad to be a jihad of Salafis only. The Jihad movement is a movement of the Ummah. And this is in line with the thinking of the great teacher of the Mujahideen Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, the Imam Shaykh Usama bin Laden (may Allah have mercy on them) and the wise Shaykh Dr Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Of course, the Salafi current historically has been a key and often driving factor behind the Jihad movement, especially during the initial stages. But, Muslims from many different schools are part of and have sacrificed for this movement. The Islamic emirate in Afghanistan are mostly followers of Hanafi fiqh who follow the Deobandi School, but they are a part of the Jihad movement."[12]

  • "Muslim Brotherhood-inspired ideologues like Sayyid Qutb cast the jihad in terms that any Sufi would have found instantly comprehensible. Jihad, according to Qutb, was intended to end the supremacy of one man over others since all men were creatures of God and none had the authority to make them his servants. Indeed, al-Qaeda — the most dramatic flowering of al-Banna's ideas — self-consciously drew on Sufi practice. Osama bin-Laden organised the group like a traditional Sufi brotherhood with himself as its Sheikh, or supreme spiritual head. New members of al-Qaeda underwent a ritual called the bayat, common to many Sufi orders, taking the hand of their leader in a symbolic acknowledgment of the spiritual connection between themselves, their Sheikh and the Prophet."[13]

Shadowwarrior8 (talk) 00:25, 10 August 2025 (UTC)[reply]
No problem! All these views and opinions should be included in the article in line with the NPOV policy. Peace.--TheEagle107 (talk) 09:49, 10 August 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The ideology section of the Infobox needs drastically trimming down. It's meant to highlight key ideologies, not every single one ever mentioned in connection with the subject. Iskandar323 (talk) 07:50, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I shall trim and summarize the infobox by removing redundant or repetitive descriptives. Shadowwarrior8 (talk) 06:45, 5 January 2026 (UTC)[reply]
This may be a Synth issue, what do RS actually say about their ideology, not that of individual members? Slatersteven (talk) 08:47, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Phrasings in RS such as "based on X" and "rooted in X" aren't really affirming that an ideology "is X" directly. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:14, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Irrelevant, we also do not waesle word, if RS do not say it, imply it or even hint at it, neither should we. Slatersteven (talk) 09:17, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Aren't we agreeing then? Iskandar323 (talk) 09:20, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I am unsure, as I am saying we should not say they believe X, do X or think X or that their beliefs are rooted in X (or based on X) unless RS explicitly say they do, semantics aside. Slatersteven (talk) 09:36, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]
And I was saying how the sources mentioned by the OP were too weasel-y to support the given label attribution. Iskandar323 (talk) 09:38, 25 November 2025 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Fancher, Reagan (2023). The Holy Warrior: Osama Bin Laden and His Jihadi Journey in the Soviet Afghan War (2nd ed.). Wilmington, Delaware: Vernon Press. p. 125. ISBN 978-1-64889-780-1.
  2. ^ Devji, Faisal (2011). Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Ithaca, New York, USA: Cornell University Press. pp. 42, 43. ISBN 0-8014-4437-3.
  3. ^ Hellmich, Christina (2020). "20: The ideology of al-Qaeda". In Akbarzadeh, Shahram (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Political Islam (2nd ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-35389-3.
  4. ^ Scheuer, Michael (2005). Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books Inc. pp. 6–8. ISBN 978-1-57488-862-1.
  5. ^ Scheuer, Michael (2005). Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror. Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books Inc. pp. 6–8. ISBN 978-1-57488-862-1.
  6. ^ "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders World Islamic Front Statement". Federation of American Scientists. August 23, 1998. Archived from the original on 25 December 2018. Retrieved 14 June 2014.
  7. ^ Kamolnick, Paul (2022). "Summary". The War against Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. DigiCat. p. 12. ISBN 978-1-66692-402-2.
  8. ^ Kiyici, Hakan (2024). Al-Qaedaism in the Context of Civil War. London: Lexington Books. pp. 146, 147. ISBN 978-1-66692-402-2.
  9. ^ Devji, Faisal (2011). Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Ithaca, New York, USA: Cornell University Press. pp. 42, 43. ISBN 0-8014-4437-3.
  10. ^ Drevon, Jerome (2024). From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 21. ISBN 9780197765166. LCCN 2024012918.
  11. ^ Lindholm, Pedro Zúquete, Charles, José (2011). "Purifying the World: The Global Jihad". The Struggle for the World: Liberation Movements for the 21st Century. Stanford, California, USA: Stanford University Press. pp. 126, 127. ISBN 978-0-8047-5937-3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  12. ^ Thakkar, Mona (2022). “Media is half of Jihad”- An interview with prominent pro Al-Qaeda translation arm- Islamic Translation Centre (ITC) (PDF). Midstone Centre. p. 7. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 June 2024.
  13. ^ Kumar, Satish (2010). India's National Security: Annual Review 2009. Routledge. pp. 348, 349. ISBN 978-0-415-57141-8.